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ICT and the state in remote and coastal Somaliland1  
 
This paper assesses the ability of information and communications technology (ICT) to improve 
centre-periphery relations and capacity building in Somaliland. Taking as its departure point Herbst's 
observation on the problematic relationship between authority and location in Africa, the paper uses 
recent developments in Somaliland's coast guard and immigration police headquarters in Hargeisa to 
assess ICT's real contribution to changing formal security provision in remote and coastal areas. ICT's 
potential as a new mode of brokerage connecting Somaliland's government and populace and politics 
and practice is for now minimal, but identifying the ways in which state-based security actors such as 
coast guards actually use ICT allows for a more accurate assessment of the variables shaping centre-
periphery relations.  
 
 
Ministers in Somaliland's ministry of the interior have long regarded security and stability as the self-
proclaimed republic's most significant achievement.2  Located in the arid north-west of the former 
Somalia, and subject to threats ranging from arms trafficking, illegal fishing, uncontrolled migration 
and terrorism to drought, Somaliland's governance (which refers here to the bargaining conducted 
amongst relevant actors) is organised around the management of insecurity, with 47% of the state 
budget of $251 million spent on security.3  Elections are relatively free and fair but government is 
decentralised, political culture is militarised, politicians are essentially unaccountable, press freedom 
is limited, civil society is weak, and access to government offices is difficult. In other words, 
Somaliland is a hybrid state in which conventional state-based structures are grafted onto traditional 
clan-based forms of governance.4   
Despite its failure to achieve international recognition, Somaliland attracts significant levels of 
support from donors ranging from the UK, Gulf States and Turkey to non-governmental organisations 
such as the Danish Demining Group (DDG). But with the exception of DDG's work in villages,5 most 
of the resultant projects focus on conditions in relatively secure urban areas such as those found in the 
capital city of Hargeisa (population 750,000), which is where politicians spend their time and most 
voters live, or the port city of Berbera (population 245,000), Somaliland's commercial capital and 
only container and general cargo port, donors know little about the details of everyday life in remote 
areas such as those bordering the Gulf of Aden. Formal accounts of the decentralised governance 
structures found in regions and districts away from the main urban areas are publicly available, with 
the Somaliland Law website referring to village councils nominated by elders and prominent persons 
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and appointed by district councils,6 but the practicalities and politics of day-to-day security 
governance are largely unknown.    
This is understandable. Such areas are physically inaccessible, insecure and out of bounds to 
international advisers and consultants; they do not have the physical infrastructure donors rely on or 
wish to use; they lack the tax-base and technical capabilities needed for sustainable services such as 
police, water, education and health; and they are notorious for isolation, unemployment, illegal 
fishing, piracy, and disputes over land and water rights. Consequently, the precise nature of the 
working relationships developed between the governance core in Hargeisa and informal security 
actors in remote and coastal settlements is known only to Somaliland officers, officials and advisers 
with an appropriate technical or political remit.  
Yet communications between the centre and the periphery should be relatively easy because despite 
low literacy levels, Somaliland has the cheapest telecommunications rates in Africa and even in 
remote settlements people have access to radios or mobile telephones, and subscriber identity module 
(SIM) cards.7 Indeed, donors and NGOs working across Africa increasingly promote the use of short 
message service (SMS) public information messaging, text alert systems and radio phone-ins as a 
means for promoting community safety, engaging communities in problem solving, improving  
information management, and developing accountability and transparency in decision making — but 
in Somaliland such happens only in urban areas. Despite repeated protestations that a locally 
appropriate form of development-oriented community-policing must be developed for rural areas, 
donors such as the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) have yet to implement such a 
model, with or without ICT. Meanwhile Somaliland's government enthusiastically welcomes projects 
exploiting technology, though its support tends to be short-lived. ICT may be a prime example of 
transnational knowledge that is capable of lessening 'the distance between government and the 
citizens and communities it is intended to serve'8 but its transfer is uneven.  
This paper considers whether the use of ICT can recast our assessment of state-capacity building and 
centre-periphery relations in remote and coastal regions such as those found in northern Somaliland. 
Put simply, it asks whether ICT has made a difference to the everyday relationship between the 
government in Hargeisa and settlements in remote coastal areas. However, rather than exploring these 
issues from the viewpoint of external actors from the North (e.g. the UK's Department for 
International Development, DFID) or the South (Ethiopia) or in terms of Somaliland's political 
development, it uses the experience of Somaliland's coast guard and immigration police to indicate 
empirical perspectives and realities; i.e. to explore the relationship between authority and location, 
and between politics and practice. Specifically, it asks whether ICT can help the non-military law-
enforcement actors working within Somaliland's populace to perform a brokerage or mediating 
function between government officials in Hargeisa and local people living in areas where there is 
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minimal capacity building and development.  It considers whether ICT has the potential to broker a 
link between the transnational practices and modernity associated with mobile telephones and the 
state-based police model found in urban areas, and the ways in which security (national and day-to-
day) is handled in remote settlements.    
Distinguishing between the role and resources of the coast guard and immigration police as 
sanctioned in Hargeisa and actually used in remote and coastal areas introduces the notion of 
brokerage, and this matters here because brokerage is embodied in specific social actors, associations, 
networks or technologies. It is not an abstract function9 or an empty signifier10  since it exists only in 
the various situations or forms in which it is realised or used. It cannot necessarily be tied to 
individuals either, because in Somaliland the role of the individual is secondary to that of the group. 
But using brokerage as a tool that expresses or influences (and is influenced by) locally-acceptable 
processes of security provision and legitimation allows for an investigation of the extent to which ICT 
affects centre-periphery relations, capacity building and security governance.   
This argument is developed in three parts. Taking Herbst's insight as its departure point, the first 
provides an overview of the environmental and security issues affecting Somaliland's remote and 
coastal areas, and of ICT's potential to make a difference to their security governance. The second 
explores Somaliland's broader experience of security-oriented brokerage using the contextualised 
practices of its coast guard and immigration police. It asks how officers use ICT and whether it makes 
a difference to their conduct of everyday business or relations with their respective headquarters and 
the government. The third concludes that ICT may be a new variable within existing power 
networks11 but it has yet to affect relations between Somaliland's security-conscious government and 
the organisations and populace it must deal with. Centre-periphery relations are less problematic than 
Herbst thought.  
The realities of Somaliland are complex, with every aspect of security governance, politics, policing 
and daily life permeated by clan-based calculations or consensus,12 yet it offers an opportunity to 
reassess the relationship between state-based authority and place in a strategically significant and 
relatively stable entity. This is important because, contrary to Herbst's observation that the 
fundamental challenge confronting African leaders is how to extend their authority over sparsely 
settled lands,13 the record of Somaliland's coast guard and immigration police suggests that the 
government of President Ahmed Mohamed Mohamoud 'Silanyo' does not wish to invest in extending 
its reach or presence. It is content to manage the periphery indirectly and flexibly from the centre, 
relying on clan-based consensus and informal decision-making to ensure politically acceptable levels 
of security and stability in the issues that concern it. Even so, the experience of the coast guard and 
immigration police emphasises that the relationship between politics and practice is far from 
straightforward, especially when it comes to senior appointments.  
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Authority and location 
In his seminal States and Power in Africa, Herbst identified a fundamental problem confronting 
African leaders: how to extend or consolidate authority over sparsely settled lands.14 The question is 
as relevant today as it was in 2000, not least because the issues it alludes to are particularly 
problematic for governments in hybrid entities such as the self-proclaimed republic of Somaliland, 
which comprises four million people in a small number of urban centres set in a sparsely populated, 
arid, insecure and under-developed environment. Further, Herbst's question can be extended to cover 
Hargeisa's response to the international community's advocacy of a federal Somalia based on 
Mogadishu. 
Even so, there are three main reasons for questioning the applicability of Herbst's insight to 
Somaliland. First, the government of President Silanyo is, like its predecessors, very security 
conscious; the republic is not recognised internationally, there are recurrent political crises, al-
Shabaab is a persistent presence, and chief security officers are beholden to the president.15 Yet it 
governs lightly in the remote and coastal regions where state representatives have long been absent or 
vulnerable, and its public agenda is dominated by issues such as illegal migration16 and territorial 
disputes with Puntland, rather than under-development or radicalisation. Second, the rationale 
underpinning Hargeisa's response cannot be attributed to ministerial inexperience or naivety because 
Somaliland's officials and senior officers have many years experience of transnational security 
governance transfers.  In the two decades following independence in 1960, its security organisations 
were trained by, amongst others, the Soviet Union, East Germany, West Germany, Israel, Egypt, 
Sudan, the UK and USA, with many of today's chief and senior officers receiving KGB training. 
However, the legacy of 20-years of military dictatorship means that for many people state incapacity 
is of less concern than state power in the hands of a rival clan; anecdotal evidence suggests that 
memories of the Barre era's repressive approach to 'directing the people' ('hamuunta') remain strong. 
Third, the availability of ICT capable of overcoming physical and, perhaps, socio-economic distance 
introduces a new variable into centre-periphery relations; Somaliland's society may be primarily 
pastoral and illiterate, but most people have access to radio communications sets or mobile 
telephones. The question therefore arises as to whether ICT can perform a brokerage function between 
the political and geographical centre and periphery, and between the reconfigurations of 
responsibility, social engineering and capacity building associated with modernity and tradition.17  
A key to understanding why the Silanyo government fails to extend its authority overtly and 
systematically is to be found in the ways in which Hargeisa-based law enforcement actors such as the 
coast guard and immigration police operate in remote and coastal areas where the state has a minimal 
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presence.  There are, however, multiple obstacles in the way of acquiring the knowledge needed to 
analyse recent developments accurately.  
Remote and coastal areas 
Regardless of the impressive results provided by social and cultural anthropologists working on police 
and gendarmes in West Africa,18 researching everyday security in Somaliland's remote and coastal 
areas is not feasible. Chronic insecurity, land and political disputes, radicalisation and the risk of 
kidnapping mean that it is impossible for internationals to 'go to the field' in order to understand how 
people go about their daily routines; 19 the EU advisers charged with developing Somaliland's coast 
guard are confined to Hargeisa and the port city of Berbera not only for bureaucratic reasons. 
Consequently, open-source international knowledge is based on the anecdotal or visual; satellite 
images of coastal settlements along the Gulf of Aden show few signs of habitation while planes flying 
to Hargeisa from Bosasso on the north-east tip of Puntland follow endless beaches of white sand 
backed by a few isolated settlements of low-quality housing linked by dirt tracks.  But it is different 
for Somaliland officials. The government's few statements on issues relating to coastal areas may be 
uninformative and its decision-making on security issues opaque and subject to pressure from, 
reputedly, individuals such as the president's youngest wife, but ministry advisers are familiar with the 
region's settlements. Wall maps in the headquarters of Hargeisa's coast guard indicate the presence of 
many villages with an average population of 50-100, and ministry advisers are familiar with their 
names and location. 
Ironically, one reason why remote and coastal areas receive little attention outside the ministry is 
because the state is not overtly present. Thus security assessments published by the Hargeisa-based 
Observatory on Conflict and Violence Prevention (OCVP) cover the town of Erigavo in the north-east 
but do not assess perceptions in settlements like Hareed or Laasa because there are no police 
present.20 Like most Somali research organisations, OCVP focuses on perceptions in urban areas such 
as Berbera, Burco and Sheekh where the police is the main source of security, supplemented in the 
more remote villages in the district concerned by informal actors such as elders and local committees. 
The district conflict and security assessment report for, e.g. Salahley district, 70 km to the south of 
Hargeisa and adjacent to the Ethiopian border, focuses on Salahley town, paying little attention to the 
28 villages that fall under its ambit.21  
Nevertheless, although OCVP does not provide assessments of remote or coastal settlements in 
Somaliland, some idea of the situation to be found in them can be gained from its reports covering 
comparable settlements in South-Central and Puntland. Relevant examples include Hobyo, a district 
in South-Central where, in the absence of police, security is provided by state-based soldiers and 
informal groups, or Bandar Beyla and Eyl in Puntland, which in the late 2000s was known as 
Somalia's pirate capital. This picture may be supplemented by UNDP assessment missions carried out 
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in Puntland's remote and neglected districts of Alula and Bargal.22 The road networks connecting 
Alula and Bargal to other districts and regions are rough and inaccessible for most of the year, 
especially for heavy vehicles, youth unemployment is estimated locally as being more than 90%, and 
there are few local NGOs, contractors or companies. As a UNDP report notes, both 'were piracy 
hotspots, remote, almost inaccessible, police presence is very limited and under equipped', and the 
state's only presence was provided by 30 ineffective soldiers.23 There are few formal links between 
political centres and periphery settlements in the former Somalia.  
This trend also holds for the urban areas in which Somaliland's police stations and posts are found.  
Wooden stalls may act as police posts in small settlements beside the road between, e.g. Hargeisa and 
the police training college at Mandeera, 60 km to the north-east, but there are few officers to be found 
even in peaceful towns such as Baligubadle, 65 km to the south of Hargeisa, where police is the main 
security provider,24 albeit with minimal resources. Those in Erigavo, a town of 35, 000 people situated 
400 km north-east from Hargeisa, lack handcuffs, walkie-talkies and transport and there is no chance 
of them responding to a call about a youth snatching a mobile at night, let alone to a robbery in a 
remote settlement 230 kilometres away.25 News reports and OCVP's respondents regularly refer to 
instances of youth violence, rape, robbery involving knives and the theft of mobile telephones in 
urban areas,26 and to rape, livestock theft and robbery in more rural areas, but Somalis have long dealt 
with crime informally and people turn first to elders or customary law (xeer), rather than police.27 And 
policing standards are low.  As the Hargeisa-based Human Rights Centre reported in 2015, officers 
regularly demand payment for responding to crime while police stations are used as detention centres 
and as such are avoided.28 Despite this, OCVP records many people asking for more police.  
Successive governments have shown no interest in addressing this situation, least of all in remote 
areas, and the link between authority and location appears to be more flexible than Herbst suggests. 
Even so, the question arises as to whether ICT could help to overcome some of the logistical 
challenges associated with increasing the state's presence and enforcement capacity.   
 ICT as brokerage  
Although the World Bank's 1997 identification of a link between ICT and state building has had little 
traction in the self-proclaimed republic, Somaliland's governments have long tolerated donor attempts 
to improve police-community relations as an aspect of state building even though — or, more likely, 
because — such projects do little more than provide desirable resources (e.g. buildings and vehicles) 
and a professional or democratic veneer. Perhaps because of this, donors currently show interest in the 
potential of ICT to facilitate a reliable, timely and reassuring police response to calls. In the context of 
Somaliland's governance, ICT means the use of mobile telephones and text messaging for security-
related alerts and crime reporting though other uses include the mobile money platform, Zaad and 
health or literacy-related programmes.29 For donors such as the EU and DFID, ICT is a means for 
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local communities to communicate with police and develop joint strategies for dealing with local 
concerns.30 Buoyed by Somaliland's high rates of access to mobiles and some of the cheapest call 
rates in the world, advisers working for the EU believe that ICT can provide a cost-effective and 
locally acceptable way to do this.31 The money transfer and telecommunications industries have used 
ICT to bridge the country's governance gap, exploiting mobiles to leap-frog the limited number of 
landlines, banks and roads, and there is no obvious reason why ICT could not help to mitigate the 
police's poor-quality response. However, the only example to date of such an initiative is a flawed 
project in Hargeisa. 
Inspired by a text alert system introduced in rural Ireland, in August 2015 EUCAP (a civilian mission 
forming part of the EU's External Action arm) introduced a text alert system based on SIM cards at a 
UNDP-supported model police station in New Hargeisa.  The results were disappointing. Ministers 
supported the initial publicity campaign enthusiastically but no calls were received in the months that 
followed, and there are no plans to introduce similar projects elsewhere in Hargeisa, let alone in 
remote or coastal areas.32 Significantly, the introduction of a toll-free 888 emergency number in 
Mogadishu has also failed, as has an NGO-run rape crisis line.   
The reasons for Somali reluctance to use ICT to report crime or contact state representatives are 
debatable, ranging from distrust and cultural preferences to concerns about confidentiality and 
inadequate police resources, but it is clear that donor expectations that ICT can help to facilitate an 
improvement in police-community relations have not been fulfilled;33 widespread access to mobiles 
has not translated into increased crime reporting, improved response rates or better police-community 
relations in urban areas, let alone a more meaningful state presence in remote areas. This is 
unsurprising because most people turn first to informal policing providers such as traditional elders 
and neighbourhood policing groups.34 Also, most police business is conducted without the use of 
technology, and even inclusive and traditional forms of ICT such as radios and paper are scarce. 
Senior officers and officials in headquarters buildings may have multiple mobiles and SIM cards (they 
do not have land lines), but with the exception of specialised technical officers in the immigration 
police and the Rapid Response Unit (RRU), whose masked officers confiscate mobiles, laptops or 
electronics found during raids, most officers have only recently acquired basic items of uniform. Even 
paper-based systems have problems, with few of the occurrence books open on desks in stations kept 
up-to-date. Literacy levels amongst Somaliland's ageing and uneducated low-ranking general duties 
police officers remain low,35 just as they do in the population as a whole.    
Although the government's evaluation of this situation is difficult to assess accurately, it is possible to 
deduce its political preferences and interest in ICT from discussions held with officials and officers 
from the Ministry of Interior, Coast Guard and Immigration Police in Hargeisa in December 2015. 
Nevertheless, a degree of caution is necessary. Government priorities for remote and coastal areas 
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may, like the evidence for meaningful statehood, be evident from the resources and support provided 
to the coast guard and immigration police, but the relationship between politics and practice remains 
opaque. Thus the resources and attention given to immigration operations in Hargeisa and along the 
Ethiopian border suggest that uncontrolled migration is of greater concern than under-development, 
illegal fishing or piracy,36 but the dismissal in February 2016 of the commander responsible for 
dramatically increasing the deportation of people with illegal stay permits emphasises that political 
and clan-based imperatives must be factored in. Whatever the explanation, addressing security 
developments in remote and coastal areas allows for a discussion of whether ICT has made a 
difference to officers' behaviour, and whether or not it is a tool enabling coast guard and specialist 
police to broker links between the centre and periphery.   
 
'Soldiering' in remote and coastal areas 
Somaliland governments have yet to engage systematically in capacity building in the country's 
remote and coastal areas while international commentators know little about everyday security 
practices in their settlements. This lack of interest is striking, given that Somaliland's 865 km (520 
miles) of coastline on the Gulf of Aden — and its proximity to Yemen (known locally as Aden) — 
make it of potential strategic significance for not only Hargeisa as it seeks international recognition, 
but also for donors such as the UK, with its large Somali population and vulnerability to 
radicalisation, and for UK-based companies such as Mott MacDonald, which provides consultancy to 
the UK-supported Somaliland Development Fund on developing public and private power providers.37  
Maritime trading nations such as Denmark and Norway have an interest too, though shipping industry 
projects on 'Somalia coastal development' appear to be confined to Berbera.38 Surprisingly, the 
formerly high incidence of piracy did not fundamentally affect this approach. Even before August 
2015, when the Financial Times reported that there had been no incidents involving Somali pirates in 
the preceding eight months,39 the international shipping community's attention focused on Puntland's 
coastal villages as a source of piracy, rather than on Somaliland's. Thus a joint venture  involving the 
UNDP, Maersk, Shell, BP, Stena and the Japanese shipping companies NYK, MOL and K Line in a 
project designed to  develop alternative livelihoods to piracy for youths in coastal villages focuses on 
Eyl, Bandar Bay, Bargalin,  Hafun, Gara’ad and the adjacent districts of Adado, South-Galkayo and 
Abudwaq. Somaliland's prison for pirates may have been a news story in 2012,40 but its coastal 
settlements have never attracted attention.  
A detailed, coherent and internationally accessible  picture of security in Somaliland's remote coastal 
settlements is unlikely to emerge for the foreseeable future,41 yet conversations with officials and 
advisers in Hargeisa in December 2015 suggest that the government's own knowledge is far from 
unsatisfactory (the  actionable intelligence provided by the secret police in Hargeisa is reputedly 
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good). For now, the role played by Somaliland's coast guards and immigration police offers an 
indicative outline of government-sponsored initiatives and priorities and local realities. 
The state's presence is signified by a small number of coast guards and immigration officers. The 
coast guard and the immigration police are not civilian or general duties police dealing directly with 
the public, but they are part of Somaliland's overall law enforcement system. Somali notions of 
policeness, of what it means to be police, are flexible42 so it comes as no surprise that the boundaries 
between the roles played by security actors in remote and coastal settlements blurs:  coast guard, 
security guard or pirate — their work is the same.43 Coast guards may theoretically be separate to 
police, being, e.g. answerable to the ministry of defence, rather than the ministry of interior, but both 
are commonly referred to as soldiers and are functionally similar when operating in remote areas; 
there is a degree of inter-operability between them.44 Additionally, both represent a potential source of 
government revenue, from port and customs charges in Berbera to entry visas at Hargeisa's airport.45   
[The significance of the two forces for donors and the local population is debatable. In theory, the 
coast guard matters for donors because its capacity to manage maritime and land-based maritime 
security affects counter-piracy, illegal fishing, maritime governance and development more broadly, 
but in practice it receives little attention from non-specialists. Anecdotal evidence suggests that in 
practice donors find many of coast guard in Berbera to be unreliable, unprofessional and ineffective, 
with all that this implies for standards in isolated posts, and similar considerations may apply to their 
views on the immigration police. The inhabitants of the few coastal settlements where coast guard and 
police are stationed are unlikely to share these views. Indeed, they may, as part of a clan-based, 
legally plural and entrepreneurial society, regard issues such as ineffectiveness, trust and corruption as 
irrelevant. Meanwhile the officers concerned are few in number and too vulnerable to do other than 
accommodate many local preferences and practices.]  
Officers from both forces probably share similar flaws of casualness or impunity too, especially when 
based in isolated settlements where qat chewing and a propensity to look the other way for a small fee 
are common; if a lack of technical skills, discipline and 'professionalism' is common in coast guard 
posts in the port city of Berbera or amongst elderly low-ranking officers in Hargeisa's immigration 
offices, there is no reason to assume that the situation is different in remote areas where officers are 
few in number and physically vulnerable. If, however, we look at remote and coastal areas from the 
point of view of senior officers in the two forces' headquarters in Hargeisa, a different picture 
emerges, one which offers an informative overview of centre-periphery relations and the dynamics 
underpinning it. 
When viewed from this perspective, the Silanyo government's seemingly relaxed approach to centre-
periphery relations reflects Somali preferences for clan-based consensus over the hierarchical 
processes associated with bureaucratic models of government. The downside is, in Somaliland as in 
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Puntland and Mogadishu, that line ministry representatives are changed unexpectedly, resulting in 
discontinuities in governance projects and policies.  For example, until recently it appeared that the 
nature of the state's presence was partly determined by the quality of leadership and resources 
available to its security agencies, for chief officers are chosen by and beholden to the president. 
Judging from the record and performance of the coast guard and immigration police, this implied that 
the Silanyo government prioritised immigration control over responding to illegal fishing and piracy. 
It meant that, contrary to the picture Dua identified as emerging in 2011, counter-piracy in Somaliland 
was no longer (if it ever was) 'a form of protection … tied to the project of state recognition'.46 Recent 
changes to the immigration police's command suggest that similar considerations may yet apply to 
immigration.    
Coast guard 47  
Formerly a functioning navy based on the Soviet model, the coast guard or maritime police consists of 
600 officers whose formal functions include presence operations, search and rescue, and anchorage 
patrols.  Like the Somaliland police, the coast guard receives significant technical and financial 
support from international organisations, prominent amongst which is EUCAP-Nestor, a civilian 
mission that assists host countries to develop a sustainable maritime security capacity. This is 
understood as including land-based maritime security in relation to development as well as addressing 
piracy and threats arising from Somaliland's proximity to Yemen, which is seen as a source of 
weapons, terrorists and illegal fishing, and EUCAP's vision of the coast guard has been accepted by 
Somaliland's ministries, the Berbera Maritime & Fisheries Academy, and local NGOs and 
universities. Its press releases show young coast guards receiving training in, e.g. navigation, boat 
handling skills, engine maintenance and first aid as well as basic maritime law, customary law (xeer), 
police work at sea and detecting improvised explosive devices,48 but the reality is less professional 
than EUCAP might wish.  
International advisers informally define success for the coast guard as evidence of limited operational 
capability, but achieving this is challenging because its technical and functional capacity is 
inadequate. It cannot patrol the sea or the land because it lacks sea-going boats, vehicles, fuel,  
communications equipment and land transport, and it cannot build cases against pirates or illegal 
fishing boats because it lacks the necessary policing (i.e. procedural) skills. Cultural issues intrude, 
too; senior officers do not display a sense of time or urgency while many sailors (or, depending on 
who is speaking, soldiers) do not understand English, the maritime language, or recognise the notion 
of a chain of evidence or manning list but are too embarrassed to ask for clarification. International 
advisers say that being a coast guard is regarded as a 'low' job. Although many are said to join for a 
sense of belonging, and older men are thought to be prepared to learn,  young recruits join for the 
money but leave quickly, being unwilling to follow orders, let alone spend months learning new 
skills. The budget for salaries is $56,000 per month, and guards are paid regularly each month though 
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many also work as guards in hotels and oil installations, which typically provide an extra $85 a 
month. ICT's limited availability has not made a difference to the ways in which coast guards see their 
role or conduct their business.      
The coast guard is significant here because its officers act as police in areas where there is no police 
but where (or when) illegal fishing, migration ('Taahrib') or the trafficking of weapons or narcotics is 
a political issue for the government or for donors. Officers may, for instance, be required to find 
witnesses though in practice they rarely show initiative, and while there was a recent attempt to give 
them police powers, the practical problems associated with this (e.g. managing chains of evidence or 
hot pursuit) meant that the proposal was not accepted. More positively, the potential of the coast 
guard — and ICT — to act as a link between the centre and periphery may be developed by EUCAP's 
'Maritime communications and coastal safety initiative', which is a new coastal safety project that 
aims to provide fishermen and seafarers with communications equipment. EUCAP is also developing 
plans to introduce community-liaison officer teams, which will visit coastal communities regularly.  
For now, ministry officials in Hargeisa say that the coast guard controls up to 25 points on the coast, 
most of which are located in places where illegal migrants traditionally cross — and where state 
representatives are paid to look the other way or, perversely, display an atypical degree of initiative 
by, for example, selling permits for illegal fishing. Approximately 100 officers ('agents') work in plain 
clothes so as to avoid being identified as coast guards. They also recruit informers who tell them when 
and where illegal activities take place, with one or two incidents logged each week, and ICT 
facilitates this. Communication between informants and the coast guard is made using pre-paid text 
messages on mobile telephones; credit is put onto the informant's mobiles, with the sum depending on 
the informant's record. Although not a conventional form of brokerage, this use of ICT helps to 
facilitate working relations at the local level and, in some cases, between the periphery and the centre. 
The extent to which the possession or use of ICT affects the behaviour of individuals is, however, 
unknown.     
The coast guards' record in the field is uneven, in remote areas as in Berbera, but — and this is key — 
it reflects the situation at the HQ in Hargeisa, which in turn reflects the government's assessment of its 
functional utility and political value. Thus the commander (admiral) appointed by the president in 
March 2015 had no background in maritime matters; he came to the post after spending four years as 
commander of the corrections force, a post which by all accounts he held very successfully, but before 
that he had spent 37-years in the police. He took over when his predecessor was shunted sideways 
into the army (the vice-admiral was moved to second in command in the army at the same time). The 
HQ staff is currently headquartered in a small rented compound comprising a handful of dark offices 
in a single-story house though the new headquarters under construction will have an impressive 
conference centre, lecture theatre, very large offices, kitchens, lavatories and a parade ground. For 
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now, the clock in the admiral's office does not work while the cooks (the only females present) spend 
their day in a corner of the open compound.   
In this way, the coast guard illustrates the nuanced relationship existing between politics and practice, 
and the limited role that ICT plays in brokering communications between the various elements. It 
suggests that the activities of low-ranking sailors in coastal areas are influenced by the culture at the 
Hargeisa headquarters, which is in turn tolerated or shaped by Silanyo's government ministers.  
Immigration Police49 
The quality of the immigration police working alongside coast guards in remote and coastal areas is 
difficult to judge. Their technical skills are unlikely to be high, yet their role is relatively high profile 
and the quality of the institution they represent is different. Based on developments in Hargeisa and at 
major crossing points in the west of the country, two things are clear: first, with the exception of the 
secret police and, perhaps, the Rapid Response Unit (RRU), the immigration police are one of the 
more proficient elements in Somaliland's law enforcement system. This seemingly owes much to the 
determination of recent chief officers to develop a force aligned to international standards and 'global 
security', but it must also reflect the government's prioritisation of controlling migration as an aspect 
of counter-terrorism and internal security. Politics and practice appear to be more positively linked 
than in the coast guard, while immigration officers make greater use of ICT.   
The immigration police's functional priority is 'combating illegal migrants' entering Somaliland and it 
does this via operations from 10 immigration centres and posts scattered along the 1,200 km of border 
(officers refer to five as 'big' and five 'small'). News reports often focus on migrants from Ethiopia 
walking to Bosasso,50 but the conflict in Yemen drives thousands across the Gulf of Aden. Also, many 
migrants are deported after their stay permits expire, with the deportation of 300 illegal immigrants, 
mostly Ethiopians, in mid January 2016 being a case in point.51 But it is uncontrolled migration 
through the porous border that links politics and practice most closely because internationals associate 
it with trans-national crimes such as smuggling, arms trafficking and terrorism52 while Hargeisa 
probably assesses it in relation to political insecurity and terrorism. No doubt Hargeisa also wishes to 
use its response as a bargaining chip in its quest for resources and recognition. And it does this 
successfully. Hence the UK, which wishes to target terrorism at source, gave security equipment and 
vehicles to the Somaliland Ministry of Civil Aviation and Air Transport to use at Berbera and 
Hargeisa airports, and to the Department of Immigration to use at land/sea/air border crossings. The 
equipment and vehicles provided were accompanied by a training and mentoring package worth £457, 
263, which aimed to ensure that airport security staff could operate X-ray, explosive trace detection 
(ETD) and CCTV equipment.53 Additionally, senior and operational staff received the mentoring and 
professional development necessary for 'a sustainable and compliant civil aviation sector.' The total 
cost of £699,465 was met by the UK's counter-terrorism programme. 
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ICT is seen as playing a significant role within this response. Indeed, the acceptance of a link between 
immigration control and ICT is evident in the immigration police's working environment, from the 
computer room in the headquarters building to visa booths at Hargeisa's airport. Even in 2012, the 
outgoing (and now current) commander, Dayib Osman Alin, had specifically promoted technology as 
a tool for enhancing border control.54 And the immigration police has undoubtedly been fortunate in 
the resources it receives. It may lack ICT at, e.g. Wajale on the border with Ethiopia, Somaliland's 
busiest crossing, but its US$ 250,000 head quarters (funded by Japan) houses a central database for a 
passport registration and data collection system. The system, known as the Personal Identification and 
Registration System (PIRS), was installed by the International Organization for Migration (IOM) as a 
contribution to improving Somaliland's migration management capacity. The IOM provided training 
for 'hundreds' of immigration, security and civil aviation officers, the rehabilitation of ports-of-entry 
at Hargeisa, Wajale, Borama and Berbera, and, significantly, equipment and IT systems for passenger 
inspection. Walk-through and hand-held metal detectors and new uniforms for 100 immigration staff 
were also provided.55 Five base stations and repeaters and 48 VHF radio handsets were installed as the 
means for securing communication between immigration's HQ in Hargeisa and major ports-of-entry 
such as Wajale and Berbera.  
But ICT's contribution should not be over-played. In interviews during December 2015, then director 
Mohamed Ali Yusuf said that his budget, resources, equipment, vehicles and logistics were 
inadequate, and that while officers in Hargeisa and Berbera have IT support, they lack connectivity. In 
fact, many HQ systems remain paper-based, some records are little more than procedural exercises, it 
takes a week for photo IDs taken at Hargeisa airport to be uploaded into the system, and the office in 
Berbera has only two laptops. The new system cannot catch the groups of 10-20 people walking from 
Ethiopia or Djibouti to Puntland, and officers rely on their experience when it comes to recognising 
false documents or identifying ex-fighters from the marks on their hands and shoulders. And 
experience counts for more than ICT in everyday business, as when 200 illegals were identified in one 
day in early 2016. Also, as Brigadier Yusuf astutely noted, the receipt of too much technical 
equipment can be counter-productive, leading to internecine rivalries and a structurally unbalanced 
security sector.  
ICT, equipment and training alone cannot facilitate capacity building or meaningful immigration 
management, least of all along Somaliland's coastal borders where six immigration officers share 
police posts at Maydh (50 km north of Erigavo), Shalaaw (28 km west of the port of Hees, which is 
also shared), Eil Daraad in Sahil region (its main city is Berbera), Lughaya (a small coastal town 20 
km west of Berbera), Bulahaar (Berbera) and Zeila (towards the Djibouti border). Selected on the 
basis of clan-based calculations, the officers concerned are reliant on informants (the phrase 'they tell 
us' was used during interviews at the immigration police's HQ), but ICT means little when even radios 
are a scarce resource.56 There is no sign of new or innovative modes of governance emerging.  
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Although the significance of individuals in shaping institutional development is less than it would be 
in the West, not least because appointments and tenure depend on presidential wishes and clan-based 
calculations, improvements in the immigration police's HQ during 2015 can be explained by Yusuf's 
determination to improve officers' technical capacity and access to ICT while fulfilling the 
immigration police's remit effectively and efficiently. Like many Somaliland officers, he has over the 
years received training from the Soviet Union as well as Israel and EU-member states, but, unlike the 
admiral, he had worked in his department since 1972 and, unlike most of his peers, in interviews in 
December 2015 he was sufficiently assured and comfortable in his authority to delegate questions and 
tasks to his staff. However, the government's support for his tough approach to immigration control 
lasted only until mid-February when he was replaced by his immediate predecessor a week after the 
president made sweeping changes to the cabinet following 'a trip east' in preparation for 2017's 
elections.57 But this is not unusual: Yusuf had taken over from Alin in 2012 when the latter was 
sacked after nine years as commander.58 Like all security organisations in the former Somalia, 
Somaliland's coast guard and immigration police are subject to political or factional pressure, which 
leads to dismissals and clashes, as in September 2015 when the deputy head of the immigration 
service was jailed for defying orders from the Ministry of Interior.   
One further feature deserves note. Despite youth unemployment, both coast guard and immigration 
police find it challenging to recruit and retain good ICT-literate officers. But the approaches adopted 
by the two forces are notably different, and those introduced in the immigration police represent a 
regional first. The coast guard is aware of its need to improve recruitment and retention but has yet to 
make a significant difference whereas Yusuf deliberately recruited computer-literate, ambitious and 
focused male graduates between the ages of 20 and 35-years who do not smoke, chew qat or drink 
alcohol. In 2015 he recruited five graduates in IT and administration from two of Hargeisa's 
universities, four from the Somaliland civil service, five with local training and 35 graduates from 
local police academies. He introduced a smart uniform of navy trousers and white shirts (in 
conversation he described it as 'the international uniform for immigration officers') which was 
intended explicitly to help facilitate professional pride, and at the time of his dismissal he was 
developing a career structure that builds on regular training, 'mentoring' and 'little incentives'; the 
projector in the training room is in regular use and every year two officers receive an 'officer of the 
year' certificate. He also created a basic welfare system to support his plans; $1 is deducted from the 
US $300 officers are paid regularly each month (this is more than regular police are paid), and the 
resultant fund is used to cover sick leave, marriages and the like. The degree of skimming appeared to 
be minimal.  Equally unusual is the large and detailed organogram of the police and ministry 
displayed in the conference room. These gestures are cosmetic and do not fundamentally affect 
centre-periphery relations yet they indicate an awareness of international approaches to the 
technicalities of security governance that is rare in Somaliland's institutions. Overall, this picture 
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suggests that while ICT is at best a minor variable in Somaliland's law enforcement system, it can be 
used as a catalyst.  
 
Conclusions  
Prompted by the trend amongst international organisations to see ICT as a tool for development,  this 
paper asks whether the use of ICT has — or can — recast centre-periphery relations and capacity-
building in a hybrid country such as Somaliland. With access to remote and coastal areas restricted, 
and the details of everyday security unknown, it uses the record and resources of the coast guard and 
immigration police to illustrate significant aspects of Somaliland's law enforcement framework, the 
relationship between its politics and practice, the practical application of its coercive resources, and 
the Silanyo government's priorities and preference for governance based on consensus and co-
existence whenever security imperatives allow. Based on this, it suggests that ICT can be a desirable 
technical or operational tool, or a functional variable in existing power networks, but that its 
introduction does not represent a new mode of security governance, transfer or brokerage. For now, 
ICT's impact on the effectiveness and efficiency of security-related knowledge and practice is 
minimal.  Its availability has not resulted in the integration of state-based and informal security 
provision into a new, flexible or coherent system of governance for Somaliland's mode of governance 
is weighted towards the centre. This suggests that while spatial metaphors such as centre-periphery 
help to clarify the situation, the significance invested in them reflects Western rationalities, rather than 
Somali realities.  
Contrary to Herbst's observation that a fundamental problem confronting African leaders concerns 
how to extend or consolidate authority over sparsely settled lands, the Silanyo government has not 
sought to overtly or systematically extend, consolidate or exert its authority in remote and coastal 
areas. Instead, it relies on clan-based consent or acquiescence to ensure politically acceptable levels of 
security in the issues that concern it, reproducing and, perhaps, representing the centre-periphery 
divide through security practices. Managing uncontrolled migration may be of more pressing concern 
than illegal fishing or piracy but, as the commander of the immigration police discovered in February 
2016, ensuring effective migration control does not guarantee presidential support.  
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